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Abstract
In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related to facility
location models defined on general metric spaces. The players are the customers (demand
points) in the location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving
its members. Specifically, the cost in our games is the service radius of the coalition.
We study the existence of core allocations and the existence of polynomial representations
of the cores of these games, focusing on network spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by
undirected graphs and positive edge lengths, and on the ℓp metric spaces defined over R
d.
Keywords: Cooperative combinatorial games, core solutions, radius, diameter.
1 Introduction
Let X be a metric space and let N0 = {v0, v1, . . . , vk} be a finite set of points in X. The
subset N = {v1, . . . , vk} is identified as the set of k players, and we refer to these points as
existing facilities, or demand points. There is also a distinguished point v0, representing the
location of a server that provides services to the players, that can be viewed as an essential
element in the system, e.g., each demand point must have access to v0. Note that v0 is not a
player. For motivation purposes, assume that the demand points represent patients, and v0
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is the location of a repairman or a medical doctor who provides assistance or health services,
respectively.
Our study is motivated by location models, where the time elapsed till the service is
provided (response time) is critical. Moreover, referring to the above example, the service of
the doctor is not necessarily provided at his home base. Instead, the coalition of patients S
can optimally select the location of the center, (e.g., clinic or hospital), where the service will
be provided. When there is a call for service, both, a patient and the doctor will travel to
the clinic. The cost of service is assumed to be the service radius, defined as the maximum
distance travelled by a patient or the doctor to the service facility (center). Using location
theory terminology, the cost of a coalition S is the solution value of the 1-center problem for
the set S ∪ {v0}.
In the rest of the paper we will use the concepts of diameter and radius. Given a finite
subset of points Y ⊆ X, its diameter D(Y ), is defined by
D(Y ) = max
y1,y2∈Y
d(y1, y2).
A pair of points y1, y2 ∈ Y , satisfying D(Y ) = d(y1, y2) is called a diametrical pair. The
radius of Y is defined by
R(Y ) = inf
x∈X
max
y∈Y
d(x, y).
A point x ∈ X satisfying R(Y ) = maxy∈Y d(x, y) is called a 1-center of Y . Note that by the
triangle inequality
R(Y ) ≤ D(Y ) ≤ 2R(Y ). (1)
We now formally define the class of cooperative cost games based on the above facil-
ity location problems that we study in this paper: The Minimum Radius Location Game
(MRLG).
First recall that a generic finite cooperative game is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set
of players and v is the characteristic function defined from 2N to R, which satisfies v(∅) = 0,
and assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N a real value (it can be a benefit or a cost). The game
(N, v) is called monotone if for any pair of subsets S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ N , v(S1) ≤ v(S2). It is called
subadditive if for any pair of subsets S1, S2 ⊆ N , v(s1 ∪ S2) ≤ v(S1) + v(S2), and it is called
submodular if for any pair of subsets S1, S2 ⊆ N , v(s1 ∪ S2) + v(S1 ∩ S2) ≤ v(S1) + v(S2).
The core of (N, v) (in the case of a cost game) is the set
C(N, v) = {x ∈ Rk : x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≤ v(S),∀ S ⊆ N}, (2)
where x(S) =
∑
j:vj∈S
xj, for any S ⊆ N .
The first game, which we have studied in a companion paper, Puerto et al. (2010), is the
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Minimum Diameter Location Game (MDLG), (N, vI), with respect to the metric space X
and the set of points N0. Its characteristic function is defined by
vI(S) = D(S ∪ {v0}).
The second game, which we study in this paper, is the Minimum Radius Location Game
(MRLG), (N, vII), with respect to the metric space X and the set of points N0. Its charac-
teristic function is defined by
vII(S) = 2R(S ∪ {v0}).
(The factor 2 in the above definition is used for convenience and comparison purposes only.)
It directly follows from the definitions that both games are monotone. Also, from (1), for
any S ⊆ N ,
vI(S) ≤ vII(S) ≤ 2vI(S).
In our companion paper we have shown that C(N, vI), the core of the MDLG, (N, vI), is
always nonempty. Moreover, there is a vector in C(N, vI) where at most 2 of its components
are positive and the rest are zero. We have also proved that recognizing whether a given
vector x is in C(N, vI) is NP-hard.
In contrast, in this paper we will demonstrate that C(N, vII), the core of the MRLG,
can be empty. In view of this result we will prove that for several important metric spaces
the core, which by definition is a polyhedral set in Rk, is nonempty and/or has a polyhedral
representation by O(kc) linear inequalities (c is independent of the number of players k, and
depends only on some parameters of the space X.) Such a representation is usually called
efficient or compact. One of these metric spaces is the network metric space induced by a
connected undirected graph and its positive edge lengths. It is defined as follows:
Suppose G = (V,E) is a connected undirected graph with positive edge lengths {le}, e ∈
E, where V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn}. When e = (vi, vj), we will also use the notation l(vi, vj) = le.
Each edge in E is assumed to be rectifiable. We refer to interior points on an edge by their
distances (along the edge) from the two nodes of the edge. A(G) is the continuum set of
points on the edges of G. For any pair of points x, y ∈ A(G), we let d(x, y) denote the length
of a shortest path in A(G) connecting x and y. We refer to A(G) as the metric space induced
by G and the edge lengths.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we demonstrate that in general the
core of the MRLG can be empty, even for a geometric planar road network where the edges
are straight lines and their lengths are the respective Euclidean distances. We observe that
for discrete spaces the MRLG may not even be subadditive, and we then prove that in the
case of geodesic spaces it is always subadditive. We also provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of core allocations, based on the relationship between the MRLG and the MDLG.
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This relationship is then used to show that even when the core of the MRLG may be empty,
any core allocation of the MDLG is a {1/2}-budget balanced allocation of the MRLG.
Section 3 is devoted to network metric spaces A(G). For such spaces we assume without
loss of generality that the set of players N is a subset of V . When N = V \ {v0} we call the
game a complete game. We present two interesting classes of graphs for which the core of
the MRLG is nonempty: median and long-diameter graphs. For any graph G, we provide a
representation of C(N, vII) by O(m|N |2) linear constraints, where m is the number of edges
of G. Such a representation implies that emptiness of the core can be efficiently checked with
linear programming methods.
A similar efficient representation having O(|X|2) constraints for a general discrete metric
space X, is given in Section 4. The special case in which N = X − {v0} will be called a
complete discrete game.
In Section 5 we study the case in which the underlying space is the ℓp metric space over
R
d, and give an efficient representation of C(N, vII), for the case where the dimension d is
fixed. We show that in the case of the infinity norm the core is always nonempty. In the
case of other norms, the emptiness is still an open question, with the exception of the planar
Euclidean case. For the latter case, which is of great importance from the application point
of view, we constructively generate a core allocation where the total cost is assigned to the
(at most) three demand points defining the smallest circle enclosing all the demand points
and the service point. The proof of this result is given in the Appendix. (This is in contrast
with the example in Section 2 which shows that the core can be empty for a geometric planar
road network where the edges are straight lines and their lengths are the respective Euclidean
distance.)
The paper ends with some conclusions and open problems. Specifically, it is still unclear
what general properties of the radius game will at least unify all the non-emptiness results
presented in this paper. Table 1 summarizes the main results in the paper.
2 Emptiness of the core C(N, vII)
We have already noted that by definition the characteristic function vII is monotone. How-
ever, when the metric space X is discrete, i.e., |X| is finite, the radius location game, (N, vII)
may not exhibit the subadditivity property. As a result players may have no incentive to
cooperate and the core can be empty, as shown in the next example.
Example 2.1 Consider a 5-node path with edge set E = {(v1, v2), (v2, v0), (v0, v3), (v3, v4)}.
The respective edge lengths are 1, 1, 2 and 2, as shown in Figure 1.
The finite (discrete) space X consists of the 5 nodes (points) with the distance function
induced by the edge lengths. X can also be viewed as a set of 5 points on the real line.
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Complete
Radius Game
Radius Game
Discrete Spaces
Empty
(3-players)
Empty (2-players)
Core’s polynomial representation
Spaces
with
continuum
General
Empty
(3-players)
Space
A(G)
Open
(nonempty
3-players)
Empty
(3-players)
Core’s polynomial representation
Space
A(T )
Nonempty
(submodular)
Nonempty
(submodular)
Core’s polynomial representation
(Rd, ℓp) Core’s polynomial representation
(Rd, ℓ1)
nonempty, d = 1, 2
open, d ≥ 3
Core’s polynomial representation
(Rd, ℓ2)
nonempty, d = 1, 2
open, d ≥ 3
Core’s polynomial representation
(Rd, ℓ∞)
nonempty, d ≥ 1
(2 players pay)
Core’s polynomial representation
Table 1: Summary of results on the core C(N, vII).
v1 v2 v0 v3 v41 1 2 2
Figure 1: Graph in Example 2.1.
Consider first the 2-player game on X defined by N = {v1, v4}. It is not subadditive since
vII({v1, v4}) > vII({v1}) + vII({v4}).
The above example can easily be modified to show that subadditivity may not hold even
for complete discrete games, i.e., when N = X \ {v0}. Specifically, consider the complete
4-player radius game defined on the above set X, and let N = X \ {v0} = {v1, v2, v3, v4}.
The smallest discrete neighborhood covering all nodes has radius 4, while the smallest
(discrete) neighborhoods covering {v1, v2, v0} and {v3, v4, v0} have radii 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Hence, vII({v1, v2, v3, v4}) = 8, vII({v1, v2}) = 2, vII({v3, v4}) = 4, and therefore
vII({v1, v2, v3, v4}) > vII({v1, v2}) + vII({v3, v4}). 
It is easy to check that unlike the above 2-player radius game defined on a discrete
metric space, every complete 2-player game, defined on a 3 point discrete metric space has a
nonempty core. The last example illustrates that a complete 4-player radius game, defined
on a 5 point discrete metric space may not be subadditive, and therefore can have an empty
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core. The next example shows that a complete 3-player game, defined on a 4 point discrete
metric space may be subadditive, and still has an empty core.
Example 2.2 Consider the discrete space defined byX = {v0, v1, v2, v3}, d(v0, v1) = d(v2, v3)
= 2 and d(v0, v2) = d(v0, v3) = d(v1, v2) = d(v1, v3) = 1. Let N = {v1, v2, v3}, and consider
the (discrete) radius game (N, vII). We have vII(N) = 4 and vII(S) = 2, for any coalition S,
with |S| ≤ 2. It is easy to see that there is no vector x = (x1, x2, x3) satisfying x1+x2+x3 = 4,
x1 + x2 ≤ 2, x2 + x3 ≤ 2, and x1 + x3 ≤ 2. 
When the metric space X consists of a continuum set of points C(N, vII) can also be
empty for a 3-player game, as illustrated by the next example of a network metric space
A(G). This example corresponds to a very simple geometric planar road network, where the
edges are line segments and their lengths are the respective Euclidean distances.
Example 2.3 Consider the graph G = (V,E) where V = {v0, v1, . . . , v6} and E = {(v0, v4),
(v0, v5), (v0, v6), (v1, v4), (v1, v6), (v2, v4), (v2, v5), (v3, v5), (v3, v6)}. All edges are of unit length,
see Figure 2.
v0
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
Figure 2: Graph in Example 2.3.
Set X = A(G). Consider the game (N, vII), defined on X, with N0 = {v0, v1, v2, v3} and
N = {v1, v2, v3}. It is easy to check that for each coalition S ⊆ N with |S| ≤ 2 we have
vII(S) = 2, and vII(N) = 4.
By symmetry, if the core was not empty the symmetric allocation x = (4/3, 4/3, 4/3)
would be in the core contradicting the constraint x1 + x2 ≤ vII({v1, v2}) = 2. 
For any metric space X, the definition of vII ensures the monotonicity of the game
(N, vII), whereas subadditivity is proved in the next proposition, under the following conti-
nuity assumption:
Definition 2.1 Let X be a metric space such that for any pair of points x, y ∈ X, and a real
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, there is a point z ∈ X such that d(x, z) + d(z, y) = d(x, y) and d(x, z) = αd(x, y).
Then X is called a “geodesic metric space”, Papadopoulos (2005).
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Proposition 2.1 If X is a geodesic metric space, then the radius game (N, vII) over X is
subadditive.
Proof. Consider a pair of coalitions, S1 and S2. We need to show that
vII(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ vII(S1) + vII(S2).
For j = 1, 2, let cj and rj be the 1-center and 1-radius of the smallest ball enclosing the
points in Sj ∪ {v0}, respectively.
Let P (c1, c2) be a shortest path in X, connecting c1 and c2. Let d(c1, c2) denote the
length of P (c1, c2). Then, d(c1, c2) ≤ d(c1, v0) + d(v0, c2) ≤ r1 + r2.
Suppose without loss of generality that r2 ≥ r1. If r2 ≥ r1 + d(c1, c2), then a center
established at c2 will ensure a covering radius of r2 to all nodes in S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {v0}. Hence,
vII(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ 2r2 = vII(S2).
If r1 ≤ r2 ≤ r1 + d(c1, c2), then consider a center established at the point c∗, such that
d(c1, c
∗) = (d(c1, c2) + r2 − r1)/2, and d(c2, c∗) = (d(c1, c2) − r2 + r1)/2. It is easy to check
that this center will ensure a covering radius of (d(c1, c2) + r1 + r2)/2 ≤ r1 + r2 to all nodes
in S1 ∪S2 ∪{v0}. (Note that v0 is in the intersection of the smallest balls enclosing S1 ∪{v0}
and S2 ∪ {v0}.) Therefore, vII(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ vII(S1) + vII(S2).

2.1 1/2-budget balanced allocations
As illustrated in previous examples, the core of the radius game can be empty even for subad-
ditive games. To address games with empty core, various cost shares have been defined. One
of them is the concept of γ-budget balanced cost allocation defined in Caprara and Letchford
(2010). Given a real γ, a vector x is a γ-budget balanced allocation of the radius game
(N, vII) if
∑
j:vj∈S
xj ≤ vII(S),∀S ⊆ N
and ∑
j:vj∈N
xj ≥ γvII(N).
It is noted in Caprara and Letchford (2010) that recently, researchers have devoted some
attention to the problem of finding an allocation which is γ-budget balanced for the maximum
possible γ. This problem is called the optimal cost share problem (OCSP).
The relationship between the MRLG and the MDLG implies that every vector in C(N, vI)
is also a 1/2-budget balanced allocation of the radius game (N, vII). Specifically, the inequal-
3 NETWORK METRIC SPACES 8
ity vI(S) ≤ vII(S) ≤ 2vI(S) (based on (1)) implies that if x ∈ C(N, vI) then, for any S ⊆ N ,
∑
j:vj∈S
xj ≤ vI(S) ≤ vII(S),
and ∑
j:vj∈N
xj = vI(N) ≥ (1/2)vII (N).
Another 1/2-budget balanced allocation, which may not be in C(N, vI), can be obtained
as follows:
In general, vII(N) is bounded below by D(N0), and therefore also by the maximum
distance from v0 to the points of N . It is bounded above by the sum of the two largest
entries in {d(vi, v0)}, vi ∈ N . Hence,
max
vi∈N
d(vi, v0) ≤ vII(N) ≤ 2max
vi∈N
d(vi, v0).
Suppose that d(vq, v0) = maxvi∈N d(vi, v0). Then, clearly, the allocation x defined by xq =
d(vq, v0) and xi = 0, for any vi ∈ N , i 6= q, is 1/2-budget balanced.
Given an arbitrary radius game with an empty core, the value γ = 1/2 is not always an
optimal solution to the respective OCSP. (See examples 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 , where the optimal
value for OCSP is γ = 3/4.) Nevertheless, the results in Sections 3-5 about the polynomial
representation of the core imply that if a radius game is defined on a discrete metric space,
the ℓp metric space defined over R
d, or the network metric space A(G), the solution to OCSP
can be found in polynomial time by solving a single linear program with |N | variables and a
polynomial number of constraints.
3 Network metric spaces
We now consider some specific metric spaces that are frequently studied in location analysis
and show that in these cases the core can be represented by a polynomial number of linear
inequalities. Note that in general we need an exponential number of linear inequalities to
represent the core of a game, (2).
Consider first the case where X = A(G), the metric space induced by an undirected
connected graph G = (V,E), V = {v0, v1, ..., vn}, and its positive edge lengths.
Assume that the set of players N satisfies N ⊆ V \ {v0}. Moreover, to be consistent with
the notation introduced above, suppose without loss of generality, that N = {v1, v2, ..., vk},
where k = |N |.
We will show that in this case, there is an efficient representation of the core of the radius
game (N, vII), involving O(m|N |2) constraints, wherem = |E|. Such a representation implies
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that membership in the core, as well as its nonemptiness can be tested in strongly polynomial
time by the algorithm in Tardos (1986).
Proposition 3.1 Consider the radius game (N, vII), defined on a network metric space
A(G), induced by a graph G = (V,E) and its positive edge lengths. Then, there is a col-
lection of subsets of N , {Si,jp,q}, (vi, vj) ∈ E, vp, vq ∈ N ∪ {v0}, (i, j, p, q) ∈ I, such that
|I| = O(m|N |2) and
C(N, vII) = {x ∈ RN+ : x(N) = vII(N), x(Si,jp,q) ≤ vII(Si,jp,q), ∀ (i, j, p, q) ∈ I}.
As a result, membership in the core, as well as nonemptiness of the core, can be tested in
strongly polynomial time.
Proof. First we note that, if N = {v1, ..., vn}, vII(N) is equal to the diameter of a minimum
diameter spanning tree of V , (Handler (1973) and Hassin and Tamir (1995)). This spanning
tree, say T ∗, solves the continuous (or absolute) 1-center problem on G, and it can be found
in O(mn+ n2 log n) time.
More generally, when N ⊆ V \{v0}, vII(S) is defined as the diameter length of a minimum
diameter spanning tree of S ∪ {v0}, ∀ S ⊆ N . Such a tree, say T ∗(S), solves the continuous
1-center problem for the subset of nodes S ∪ {v0}, and it can be found in O(mn + n2 log n)
time, (Hassin and Tamir (1995)). Recall that the continuous 1-center problem for some subset
V ′ ⊆ V , defines the smallest radius neighborhood in the metric space A(G), which covers V ′.
Moreover, T ∗(S) has the following property. There is an edge of G, say (vi, vj), such that
the 1-center of T ∗(S) is on this edge, see Hassin and Tamir (1995), and
vII(S) = d(vp, vi) + l(vi, vj) + d(vj , vq),
for some nodes vp, vq ∈ S ∪ {v0}.
In total there are at most O(|N |2) centers of minimum diameter trees on the edge (vi, vj).
Each such center ci,jp,q is associated with a radius of the form
ri,jp,q = (d(vp, vi) + l(vi, vj) + d(vj , vq))/2.
Next, for each center ci,jp,q such that d(v0, c
i,j
p,q) ≤ ri,jp,q, define the maximal coalition
Si,jp,q = {u ∈ N : d(u, ci,jp,q) ≤ ri,jp,q}.
Let
I = {(i, j, p, q) : (vi, vj) ∈ E, vp, vq ∈ N ∪ {v0}, d(v0, ci,jp,q) ≤ ri,jp,q}.
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Next consider a coalition S ⊆ N . Then, from the above discussion it follows that there
is some center ci,jp,q and radius r
i,j
p,q, such that vII(S) = 2r
i,j
p,q, and S ⊆ Si,jp,q. Hence, the
monotonicity of the game implies that the core constraint x(S) ≤ vII(S) is implied by the
constraint x(Si,jp,q) ≤ vII(Si,jp,q). This validates the efficient representation of the core stated in
the proposition. Finally, note that using the above algorithms for solving 1-center problems, it
takes polynomial time to construct the entire collection {Si,jp,q}, (vi, vj) ∈ E, vp, vq ∈ N∪{v0},
(i, j, p, q) ∈ I. In particular, membership in the core, as well as its nonemptiness can be tested
in strongly polynomial time by the algorithm in Tardos (1986). This completes the proof.

Remark 3.1 Dealing with MRLG defined on a network metric space we can assume without
loss of generality that the underlying graph G = (V,E) is a complete graph, and its edge
lengths satisfy the triangle inequality. Otherwise, we can always introduce an edge between
any pair of nodes and set its length equal to the distance in A(G) between the pair. Consider
a coalition S. We note that in this case each simple path of T ∗(S) has at most 3 edges.
However, even in this case T ∗(S) is not necessarily a subtree of Gv0(S), the subgraph of G
induced by the node set S ∪ {v0}. As an example consider the complete graph with node set
V = {v0, v1, v2, v3}. Let the length of the edges (v3, v0), (v3, v1), (v3, v2) be equal to 1, and
the length of the other 3 edges equal to 2. When S = {v1, v2}, T ∗(S) is the star centered at
v3, which is not in Gv0(S).
Corollary 3.1 If G is a tree, there is a collection of subsets of N , {Sp,q}, vp, vq ∈ N ∪{v0},
p, q ∈ I ′, such that |I ′| = O(|N |2), and the core of the game (N, vII) is defined by
C(N, vII) = {x ∈ RN+ : x(N) = vII(N), x(Sp,q) ≤ vII(Sp,q) ∀ p, q ∈ I ′}.
Proof. If G is a tree the total number of centers of relevant minimum diameter spanning
subtrees is only O(|N |2). In this case each pair of nodes, vp, vq contributes one candidate
center, denoted by cp,q, the midpoint of the unique simple path connecting vp with vq. If
d(v0, cp,q) ≤ d(vp, vq)/2, the respective maximal coalition is then defined by
Sp,q = {u ∈ N : d(u, cp,q) ≤ d(vp, vq)/2}.
Set I ′ = {(p, q) : d(v0, cp,q) ≤ d(vp, vq)/2}. Then, the general result in Proposition 3.1
leads to the simpler description of C(N, vII) stated in the corollary. 
Also, when G is a tree the radius and the diameter games coincide, i.e., vI(S) = vII(S)
for any S ⊆ N . As shown in our companion paper, Puerto et al. (2010), the radius game is
submodular in this case, its core is always nonempty, and both its Shapley value and nucleolus
can be computed in polynomial time.
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Remark 3.2 Given an undirected connected graph G = (V,E), with V = {v0, v1, ..., vn},
we observe that the respective metric space X = A(G), induced by G and its positive edge
lengths, is geodesic. Example 2.3 illustrates that when the set of players N is a proper subset
of V \ {v0} = {v1, ..., vn}, the core of the radius location game can be empty. However, we
still do not know whether the core of the game (N, vII) defined on the space X = A(G) is
always nonempty in the case where G = (V,E) is a general connected undirected graph and
N = {v1, ..., vn}. We will refer to this case as the Complete Minimum Radius Location game
(CMRLG) on networks.
We now focus on some observations and special cases of the complete radius game, CM-
RLG. First we note that the function vII may not be submodular if the graph G contains a
cycle.
Example 3.1 Consider a 4-cycle with unit edge lengths, and V = {v0, v1, v2, v3}, see Figure
3.
v0
v1
v2
v3
1 1
11
Figure 3: Graph in Example 3.1
Let S1 = {v1, v2} and S2 = {v3, v2}. Then, vII(S1) = vII(S2) = 2, vII(S1 ∪ S2) = 3,
vII(S1 ∩ S2) = 2, and therefore vII(S1 ∪ S2) + vII(S1 ∩ S2) > vII(S1) + vII(S2). 
We have noted in the Introduction that there is a core allocation for the diameter game
(N, vI) splitting vI(N) between a pair of players corresponding to the diameter of V . In
contrast, the core of the complete radius location game (N, vII) may not in general contain an
allocation where only 2 players pay a positive cost. For instance, in Example 3.1 d(v0, v2) = 2,
and d(v0, v1) = d(v0, v3) = 1. However the unique core allocation is the vector (1, 1, 1).
We also note in passing that in our attempts to prove that the core of the CMRLG is
nonempty, we have produced more involved examples, indicating that in general there is no
fixed number c, such that for any n, there is a core allocation, where the number of players
paying a positive cost is bounded by c.
To summarize, we still do not know whether the core of the MRLG is always nonempty
for the case where X = A(G) and N = V \ {v0}.
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We have proven the nonemptiness of the core only for the case where G = K4, i.e., when
there are 3 players. (Our proof, based on a tedious case analysis, can be obtained from the
authors upon request.)
Next we consider two families of graphs for which the respective radius games have
nonempty cores. We use the following observation.
Remark 3.3 Given the metric space X and the set of points N0, consider the games (N, vI)
and (N, vII). For each subset S ⊆ N , vI(S) ≤ vII(S). Therefore, if vI(N) = vII(N),
C(N, vI) ⊆ C(N, vII). For example, for any graph G = (V,E), if X = A(G) and V satisfies
D(V ) = 2R(V ), then C(N, vII) is nonempty. This holds for the class of median graphs (which
includes all tree graphs), and the class of graphs with “long diameters”.
3.1 Median graphs
A median graph G = (V,E) is defined by the following property, (Mulder (1978, 1980)). For
any triplet of nodes, {x, y, z}, there is a unique node, v = m(x, y, z), called the median of
{x, y, z}, which is in the intersection of the node sets of all shortest paths connecting distinct
pairs of nodes from the triplet {x, y, z}.
Lemma 3.1 Let G = (V,E) be a median graph with positive edge lengths. Then, vI(N) =
D(V ) = 2R(V ) = vII(N) in the metric space X = A(G).
Proof. To prove that for a median graph G = (V,E), D(V ) = 2R(V ), consider P (x, y) to
be a longest path in a minimum diameter spanning tree T ∗ of G. From the triangle inequality
D(V ) ≤ dT ∗(x, y) = 2R(V ). It is therefore sufficient to show that dG(x, y), the distance from
x to y in A(G) is equal to 2R(V ).
Let z be the 1-center defined as the middle point of P (x, y), (Hassin and Tamir (1995)).
Suppose without loss of generality that z is a node. (Otherwise, augment it to the node set
of G. The new graph is still median, and its diameter is equal to that of G.)
Now apply the median property to the triplet {x, y, z}. From the definition of z as a
center, the two subpaths of P (x, y) in T ∗, connecting z with x, and z with y are in fact,
respectively, shortest paths in G, between z and x, and between z and y. Since z is the only
node which is in both subpaths, z must be the median of {x, y, z}. Hence, z must be on every
shortest path in G, connecting x and y. Therefore, dG(x, z) + dG(z, y) = dG(x, y). But the
right hand side of the latter equation is, by definition, equal to 2R(V ). 
3.2 Long-diameter graphs
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected and connected graph with positive edge lengths {le}, e ∈ E.
For each node v ∈ V define f(v) to be the maximum of the lengths of all edges which are
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incident to v. G is called a long-diameter graph if D(V ) ≥ (2/3)∑v∈V f(v). For example, if
all edges are of unit length, G is such a graph if D(V ) ≥ 2|V |/3. It has been recently proved
by Liu and Huang (2009), that for a long-diameter graph G = (V,E), D(V ) = 2R(V ).
Hence, from the above discussion we can conclude that for long-diameter graphs, the core of
the minimum radius location game is nonempty.
3.3 MSTG and MRLG
In the case of a network metric space it is interesting to compare the MRLG with the related
minimum length spanning tree game (MSTG), Megiddo (1978) and Granot and Huberman
(1981, 1984). As we noted above, in the MRLG (N, vII) the characteristic function is defined
by the minimum diameter spanning Steiner subtree while in the MSTG, which we denote by
(N, v′), the characteristic function v′(S) is defined by the minimum length Steiner subtree
spanning S ∪ {v0}. By definition, we have vII(S) ≤ v′(S) for any coalition S. Therefore,
if vII(N) = v
′(N), the core of the MRLG is contained in the core of the minimum length
spanning tree game. Specifically, the latter holds if the minimum diameter spanning tree of
V is a spanning path.
In general, it is known that when N is a proper subset of V \ {v0}, C(N, v′), the core
of the MSTG can be empty, see Tamir (1991). Moreover, testing membership in C(N, v′) is
NP-hard, see Faigle et al., (1997).
Consider the complete case, i.e., N = V \ {v0}. Then, given some minimum length
spanning tree T ∗∗ of N ∪ v0, there is a natural allocation in C(N, v′) that does not depend
on the edges outside T ∗∗. In this core allocation, the cost allocated to node vi is the length
of the unique edge incident to vi which is on the (unique) path of T
∗∗, connecting vi to v0,
Bird (1976), Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984).
This is not the case for the MRLG. All core allocations may depend on edges outside T ∗,
as shown in the following example.
Example 3.2 Consider the graph G = (V,E) where
V = {v0, v1, v2, v3}, E = {(v0, v1), (v0, v3), (v1, v2), (v1, v3), (v2, v3)}.
The edge lengths are l(v0, v1) = 0.5, l(v0, v3) = l(v2, v3) = 4, l(v1, v2) = 7, l(v1, v3) = 4 + ǫ,
see Figure 4.
The unique minimum diameter spanning tree of G, T ∗, is defined by the star centered at
v3. The diameter of G is attained by the pair of nodes v0 and v2. Any core allocation cannot
charge v1 more than 0.5. Hence, if a core allocation ignores the edges outside T
∗, and assigns
charges which are distances on T ∗, v1 will have to be charged 0. But then v2 and v3 together
cannot be charged more than 8, which is less than D(T ∗) = 8 + ǫ.
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v0
v1
v2
v3
7
4
4 + ǫ
0.5
4
Figure 4: Graph in Example 3.2.
One extreme allocation in the core is defined by the vector (x1, x2, x3) = (ǫ, 4, 4). The
other three core extreme points are (ǫ, 7.5 − ǫ, 0.5 + ǫ), (0.5, 7, .5 + ǫ), (0.5, 3.5 − ǫ, 4). 
4 Discrete metric spaces
We have already noted above that when the underlying metric space X consists of a finite
number of points, the respective MRLG may not even be subadditive and players may not
have incentives to cooperate, e.g., the core C(N, vII) can be empty. Nevertheless, in the
discrete finite case C(N, vII) has a compact representation, as shown in the next proposition,
and therefore its nonemptiness can be tested efficiently.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that X = {v0, v1, ..., vn} is a finite metric space, and let N ⊆
X \ {v0}. For each i = 0, 1, ..., n, and vp ∈ N ∪ {v0}, define rip = d(vi, vp). If d(v0, vi) ≤ rip,
define
Sip = {u ∈ N : d(u, vi) ≤ rip}.
Let I = {(i, p) : d(v0, vi) ≤ rip}. Then,
C(N, vII) = {x ∈ RN+ : x(N) = vII(N), x(Sip) ≤ vII(S), ∀ (i, p) ∈ I}.
Proof. Consider a coalition S ⊆ N . Then, there is some vi ∈ X, and vp ∈ N ∪ {v0},
such that vII(S) = 2d(vi, vp) = 2r
i
p. By definition S ⊆ Sip. Using the monotonicity of the
game, we conclude that the core constraint x(S) ≤ vII(S) is dominated by the constraint
x(Sip) ≤ vII(Sip). This completes the proof.

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5 ℓp metric spaces over R
d
In this section we focus on the case in which the MRLG (N, vII) is defined on the ℓp metric
space over Rd. Again, we let N0 = V = {v0, v1, ..., vn} be a set of points in Rd, and set
N = V \ {v0}.
The following examples show that in general the MRLG is not submodular, and that with
the exception of the case p =∞, vI(N) = D(V ) 6= 2R(V ) = vII(N). Hence, the existence of
core allocations is not clear in the case where p 6=∞.
Example 5.1 Consider the planar ℓp normed case with V = {v0, v1, v2, v3}, where, v0 =
(0, 0), v1 = (0, 1), v2 = (1, 0) and v3 = (−1, 0).
We have vII({v1, v2, v3}) = 2, vII({v1}) = 1, and vII({v1, v2}) = vII({v1, v3}) = 21/p.
Thus, vII is not submodular in this example for any p such that 2
1/p < 3/2, which in
particular applies to 2 ≤ p ≤ ∞. 
Example 5.2 Consider the planar ℓ1 case with V = {v0, v1, v2, v3}, where, v0 = (0, 0),
v1 = (1,−1), v2 = (1, 1) and v3 = (−1,−1). We have vII({v1, v2, v3}) = 4, vII({v1}) = 2, and
vII({v1, v2}) = vII({v1, v3}) = 2. Thus, vII is not submodular in this case. 
The next two examples show that for any 1 < p < ∞ in the planar case, and for the
rectilinear norm ℓ1, even in R
3, vII(N) = 2R(N ∪ {v0}) can be strictly larger than vI(N) =
D(N ∪ {v0}). (In R2 the ℓ1 norm is equivalent to the ℓ∞ norm.)
Example 5.3 Consider the set of points V = {v0, v1, v2, v3} where v1 = (a, b), v2 = (−a, b),
v3 = (0,−1), and v0 = (0, 0). For 1 < p < ∞, let a = b = 2−1/p. Then, the ℓp diameter
of V is (ap + (b + 1)p)1/p whereas the ℓ1 radius is 1 and the 1-center is (0, 0). Hence,
vI(N) = D(V ) < b+ 1 < 2 = 2R(V ) = vII(N). 
Example 5.4 Consider the set of points V = {v0, v1, v2, v3} where v1 = (1, 1, 1), v2 =
(−1,−1, 1), v3 = (−1, 1,−1), and v0 = (1,−1,−1). The ℓ1 diameter of V is 4 whereas
the ℓ1 radius is 3 and the 1-center is (0, 0, 0). Hence, vI(N) = D(V ) < 2R(V ) = vII(N). 
We first show that for any p ≥ 1, the core of the game (N, vII), defined on the ℓp
metric space over Rd, can be represented as a set described by a polynomial number of linear
inequalities, for any fixed d.
Consider first the case where 1 < p <∞.
Theorem 5.1 Let 1 < p < ∞, and consider the game (N, vII), defined on the ℓp metric
space over Rd. Let {Sj}, j ∈ J , be the collection of all subsets S ⊆ N with |S| ≤ d + 1. For
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each j ∈ J , let B(Sj), be the smallest enclosing ball containing Sj ∪ {v0}, and let S′j be the
subset of all points in N , contained in B(Sj). Then the core of the game is given by,
C(N, vII) = {x ∈ Rn+ : x(S′j) ≤ vII(Sj), ∀ j ∈ J, and x(N) = vII(N)}.
Proof. For any subset S ⊆ N , vII(S) is the diameter of B(S), a smallest enclosing ball
containing S ∪ {v0}. (Since 1 < p <∞, B(S) is unique, Zurcher (2007).)
By the Helly property there is a subset Sj ⊆ S, j ∈ J , such that vII(S) = vII(Sj). Then,
by definition S ⊆ S′j . Moreover, by the monotonicity of the game each vector in the core is
nonnegative, and therefore x(S) ≤ x(S′j). Hence, the constraint x(S) ≤ vII(S) is dominated
by the constraint x(S′j) ≤ vII(Sj). This completes the proof. 
Next, consider the case where p = ∞. As above, let {Sj}, j ∈ J , be the collection of all
subsets S ⊆ N with |S| ≤ d + 1.
Theorem 5.2 Consider the game (N, vII), defined on the ℓ∞ metric space over R
d. Then
there is a collection of subsets of N , {S∞j (k)}, j ∈ J , k = 1, ..., c∞j (n,d), such that c∞j (n,d) =
O(2dn(d−1)), and the core of the game is given by,
C(N, vII) = {x ∈ Rn+ : x(S∞j (k)) ≤ vII(Sj), ∀ j ∈ J, k = 1, ..., c∞j (n,d) and x(N) = vII(N)}.
Proof. For each subset S the problem of finding the smallest ℓ∞ ball enclosing S is reduced
to finding a smallest hypercube containing S. Such a hypercube is not unique. The set of
centers of all optimal hypercubes is itself a hypercube of dimension less than or equal to d−1.
For j ∈ J consider an optimal hypercube H(Sj) enclosing Sj ∪{v0} and let P (H(Sj)) be the
maximal subset of N , contained in H(Sj). We can shift H(Sj) along the axes and obtain
an optimal hypercube H ′(Sj) such that P (H
′(Sj)) = P (H(Sj)), and for each coordinate
i = 1, ..., d, one of the two faces of H ′(Sj) corresponding to the i
th coordinate contains a point
in N . Thus, there is only c∞j (n,d) = O(2
dn(d−1)) such maximal subsets of N , associated with
a given subset Sj, j ∈ J . Denote this collection of subsets by {S∞j (k)}, k = 1, ..., c∞j (n,d).
Using the monotonicity of the game and following the arguments used in the previ-
ous proof, we observe that for each subset S ⊆ N , there is a subset Sj , j ∈ J , and
k = 1, ..., c∞j (n,d), such that the constraint x(S) ≤ vII(S), is dominated by the constraint
x(S∞j (k)) ≤ vII(Sj). This completes the proof. 
A similar analysis applies to the rectilinear case when p = 1.
Theorem 5.3 Consider the game (N, vII), defined on the ℓ1 metric space over R
d. Then
there is a collection of subsets of N , {S1j (k)}, j ∈ J , k = 1, ..., c1j (n,d), such that c1j (n,d) =
O(2d
2
nd−1), and the core of the game is given by,
C(N, vII) = {x ∈ Rn+ : x(S1j (k)) ≤ vII(Sj), ∀ j ∈ J, k = 1, ..., c1j (n,d) and x(N) = vII(N)}.
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Proof. The proof goes along the lines of the previous proof and is therefore outlined only.
In this case an ℓ1 enclosing ball is a polyhedron with 2
d faces. Again, by shifting an enclosing
ball of a subset Sj, j ∈ J , along the normals to the facets, each given subset Sj, j ∈ J , is
associated with c1j (n,d) maximal subsets of N , where c
1
j(n,d) = O(2
d2nd−1). Denote this
collection of subsets by {S1j (k)}, k = 1, ..., c1j (n,d).
As above, we observe that for each subset S ⊆ N , there is a subset Sj, j ∈ J , and
k = 1, ..., c1j (n,d), such that the constraint x(S) ≤ vII(S), is dominated by the constraint
x(S1j (k)) ≤ vII(Sj). This completes the proof. 
With the exception of the case p =∞, we do not know yet whether C(N, vII) is nonempty
for all ℓp metric spaces over R
d. We assume without loss of generality that vi 6= v0 for all
i = 1, ..., n.
Theorem 5.4 The core of the game (N, vII), defined on the ℓ∞ metric space over R
d, is
nonempty. Specifically, C(N, vI) = C(N, vII).
Moreover, if D(N0) = d(v0, vj), for some vj ∈ N , the dimension of C(N, vII) is n − 1,
and there is x∗ ∈ C(N, vII) such that x∗t > 0, for any vt ∈ N . Also, if D(N0) = d(vi, vj),
for some vi, vj ∈ N , and d(vi, vj) < d(vi, v0) + d(vj , v0), then the dimension of C(N, vII) is
n− 1, and there is x∗ ∈ C(N, vII) such that x∗t > 0, for any vt ∈ N .
Proof. When p = ∞, it is easy to see that for any set S we have vI(S) = D(S ∪ {v0}) =
2R(S∪{v0}) = vII(S). Thus, C(N, vI) = C(N, vII), and the nonemptiness of the core follows
from Remark 3.3.
Suppose without loss of generality that D(N0) = d(v0, v1). Let α = (α1, α2, ..., αn) be
an arbitrary real vector satisfying 0 ≤ α1 ≤ mint=1,...,n d(v0, vt), α1 =
∑n
j=2 αj and αj ≥ 0,
j = 2, ..., n.
We show that the allocation xα = (d(v0, v1) − α1, α2, ..., αn) is in C(N, vII). First, by
definition xα(N) = d(v0, v1) = D(N0) = vII(N). Next consider a coalition S ⊆ N . If v1 ∈ S,
then xα(S) ≤ d(v0, v1) ≤ vII(S). If v1 6= S, then xα(S) ≤ α1 ≤ mint=1,...,n d(v0, vt) ≤ vII(S).
To see that the dimension of C(N, vII) in this case is n − 1, let ǫ be a sufficiently small
positive real, and consider the n− 1 independent core allocations {xα(q)}, q = 2, ..., n, where
α(q) is the vector defined by α1(q) = ǫ, αq(q) = ǫ, and αt(q) = 0, for any t = 2, ..., n; t 6= q.
The allocation x∗ =
∑n
q=2 x
α(q)/(n− 1) is in the core and has strictly positive components.
Next, suppose without loss of generality that D(N0) = d(v1, v2) and d(v1, v2) < d(v0, v1)+
d(v0, v2). Let δ1, δ2 be a pair of positive reals satisfying 0 < δ1 < d(v0, v1), 0 < δ2 < d(v0, v2),
and δ1 + δ2 = d(v1, v0) + d(v2, v0)− d(v1, v2).
Let α = (α1, α2, ..., αn) be an arbitrary real vector satisfying α1 ≤ d(v1, v0) − δ1, α2 ≤
d(v2, v0)−δ2, 0 ≤ α1+α2 ≤ mint=1,...,n d(v0, vt), 0 ≤ α1+α2 ≤ min{δ1, δ2}, α1+α2 =
∑n
j=3 αj
and αj ≥ 0, j = 1, ..., n.
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We show that the allocation
xα = (d(v0, v1)− δ1 − α1, d(v0, v2)− δ2 − α2, α3, ..., αn)
is in C(N, vII). First, by definition x
α(N) = d(v1, v2) = D(N0) = vII(N). Next consider a
coalition S ⊆ N . If v1, v2 ∈ S, then xα(S) ≤ d(v1, v2) = vII(S). If v1 ∈ S, v2 6= S, then
xα(S) ≤ d(v1, v0)− δ1 − α1 +
∑n
q=3 αq ≤ d(v1, v0)− α2 − α1 +
∑n
q=3 αq ≤ d(v1, v0) ≤ vII(S).
Similarly, if v1 6= S, v2 ∈ S, we obtain xα(S) ≤ d(v2, v0) ≤ vII(S). Finally, suppose that
v1, v2 6= S. Then, xα(S) ≤ α1 + α2 ≤ mint=1,...,n d(v0, vt) ≤ vII(S).
To see that the dimension of C(N, vII) in this case is n − 1, let ǫ be a sufficiently small
positive real, and consider the collection of n − 2 independent core allocations {xα(q)}, q =
3, ..., n, where α(q) is the vector defined by α1(q) = ǫ, αq(q) = ǫ, and αt(q) = 0, for any
t = 2, ..., n; t 6= q. Add to this collection the allocation xα(2), where α(2) is the vector
defined by α2(q) = ǫ, α3(q) = ǫ, and αt(q) = 0, for any t = 1, ..., n, t 6= 2, 3. The allocation
x∗ =
∑n
q=2 x
α(q)/(n− 1) is in the core and has strictly positive components. This completes
the proof. 
Augmenting the result in the last theorem, the next example illustrates that when the
conditions in the theorem are not satisfied, the dimension of the core can even be zero.
Specifically, for any number of players, even in the ℓ∞ planar case, the core can be a singleton
where only two players share the total cost, in spite of the fact that the distance from each
player to the server v0 is positive.
Example 5.5 Consider the set of points N0 = {v0, v1, ..., vk} where v0 = (0, 0), v1 = (0, 1),
v2 = (0,−1), v3 = (1, 0) and vi = (ai, 0), 0 < ai < 1, for i = 4, 5, ..., k. Since vI(S) = 2,
if {v1, v2} ⊆ N , and vI(S) ≤ 1, otherwise, it is easy to see that C(N, vI) = C(N, vII) =
{(1, 1, 0, ..., 0)}. 
Corollary 5.1 The core of the game (N, vII), defined on the ℓ1 metric plane is nonempty.
Specifically, C(N, vI) = C(N, vII).
Proof. Since the rectilinear norm, ℓ1, is equivalent to the ℓ∞ norm on the plane, for any
subset S, D(S ∪ {v0}) = 2R(S ∪ {v0}) for the rectilinear planar case. Therefore, the core of
the respective minimum radius game in the plane is nonempty. 
5.1 Euclidean spaces
Turning to the Euclidean case, in general, the equality vI(N) = vII(N) may not hold even
in the planar case. From Proposition 2.1 it follows that the characteristic function vII(S)
is subadditive also for the Euclidean model. However, it does not follow from the general
analysis in previous sections that the core of the Euclidean planar game is nonempty.
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In spite of that, we will prove that C(N, vII) is nonempty for the Euclidean planar case.
More specifically, there is a core allocation where at most 3 players (points) pay positive
amounts. These are points defining C(V ), the minimal circle in the plane enclosing the set
V .
Theorem 5.5 The core C(N, vII) of the minimal radius location game (N, vII) in the Eu-
clidean planar case is non-empty.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Remark 5.1 In the minimum radius location game (N, vII), for each coalition S, vII is
defined as twice the solution value to the 1-center problem for the set of nodes S ∪ {v0}.
Similarly we can consider location games defined by other common optimization criteria often
used in facility location models. For example, consider the minimum median location game,
(N, vIII), where for each coalition S, vIII is defined as the solution value to the 1-median
problem for the set of nodes S ∪ {v0}.
We note that from the cooperative point of view the above definition does not even induce
the desirable property of subadditivity. Thus, players may not even have the incentive to
cooperate, as shown in the following example.
Example 5.6 Consider a 4-node path with the edge set E = {(v1, v0), (v0, v2), (v2, v3)}.
Edges are of unit length. It is easy to see that vIII(N) = 4, vIII({v1}) = 1 and vIII({v2, v3}) =
2. Hence, vIII({v1}) + vIII({v2, v3}) = 3 < 4 = vIII(N). The core is empty in this example
since the set of constraints, x1 ≤ 1, x2 + x3 ≤ 2 and x1 + x2 + x3 = 4 is inconsistent. 
Two different median related cooperative games where subadditivity is ensured by intro-
ducing set up costs can be found in Puerto et al. (2001) and Mallozi (2011).
6 Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we have introduced a new class of cooperative location games, the Minimum
Radius Location Game (MRLG). In such a game the characteristic function is defined as the
radius of each coalition, including a distinguished point that can be viewed as a server. Mo-
tivated by potential applications, we have focused mainly on the important cases of network
metric spaces and the ℓp-normed spaces over R
d. For these spaces we give complete polyhe-
dral characterizations of the core of the MRLG by using only a polynomial number of linear
inequalities. Using these characterizations, emptiness of the core can be tested efficiently by
linear programming algorithms.
We have shown that, in general, the core of the MRLG might be empty even for geometric
planar road networks with Euclidean distances. In contrast, we have proved that for the
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Euclidean normed plane the core is always nonempty. Moreover, we have constructed a core
allocation in which at most three players pay positive costs. These players correspond to the
demand points defining the minimal circle enclosing all the demand points and the server.
With the exception of the planar Euclidean case and the ℓ∞ space, for any d ≥ 1, it is
still unknown whether the MRLG has a nonempty core for any ℓp space.
We have also given some sufficient conditions for the core to be nonempty. These con-
ditions are based on the relationship between the MRLG and the MDLG, which always has
some core allocation. Similar to the Euclidean planar case, in the core allocations that we
construct only a pair of players share the total cost. Although practically allocations where
only a very small number of players pay some positive cost, may not be easy to implement,
their main role is just to establish the nonemptiness of the core. As illustrated in Section 5,
in some cases the core itself is a singleton, where only two players share the total cost. If
the core is not a singleton of the above type, then to get an allocation in the core which is
more “acceptable”, one can use linear programming methods on the aforementioned efficient
characterizations of the core. For example, to find a core allocation where each player vi,
vi 6= v0, shares some positive part of vII(N), we can consider the problem of finding a core
allocation which will maximize the minimum pay over all these players. The latter can be
formulated as a linear program over the core.
We conclude with a few more open questions. First, it is still unclear what general
properties of the radius game will at least unify the nonemptiness results presented here, e.g.,
for median graphs and the Euclidean plane. Second, we have demonstrated that the core can
be empty for simple geometric network spaces, where several nodes, different from the server,
are not players. Is the core always nonempty when there are no such nodes, i.e., when the
game is complete? Finally, in spite of our efforts we have not been able to find a shorter and
more elegant proof of the nonemptiness of the core of the MRLG in the planar Euclidean
case, using general tools from cooperative game theory, e.g., Bondareva-Shapley conditions,
or equivalently linear programming duality. Is there such a proof?
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7 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 5.5
First of all, note that we have not been able to produce a short existence proof of core
allocations, based on known general theorems in cooperative game theory. Instead, our proof
is based on a long case analysis.
We divide the proof analyzing three exhaustive cases depending on the relative position
of C(V ) (the minimum circle in the plane enclosing V ):
i) C(V ) is determined by two points of V (Proposition 7.1).
ii) C(V ) is determined by three points of V and v0 is one of them (Proposition 7.2).
iii) C(V ) is determined by three points and v0 is not among them (Proposition 7.3).
Remark 7.1 Our proof is based on showing that the core of the subgame defined by at most
three players, say {v1, v2, v3}, corresponding to the points defining C(V ) is nonempty. Of
course, the latter subgame can be viewed as a 3-player game on a complete graph G with at
most eight nodes. The four extra nodes, augmenting {v0, v1, v2, v3}, are those representing
the centers of the minimal circles enclosing the four triplets {(v0, v1, v2), (v0, v1, v3),
(v0, v2, v3), (v1, v2, v3)}, respectively. The edge lengths of G, inducing the respective space
A(G), are the Euclidean distances between the respective pairs of points representing the
edges.
Proposition 7.1 If the minimal circle enclosing V is determined by two points in V , then
C(N, vII) 6= ∅.
Proof. We observe that in this case, D(V ) = 2R(V ) since the two points are diametrical.
Hence, vI(N) = vII(N), and the result follows from Remark 3.3. 
Next, suppose that C(V ) is determined by the points in V ′ = {vi1 , vi2 , vi3}. Specifically,
if r∗ = R(V ) is the radius of this circle, then the radius of C(V ′), the minimal circle enclosing
V ′ is also r∗. Without loss of generality assume that V ′ = {v1, v2, vi3}, where vi3 = v0 or
vi3 = v3, depending on cases (ii) and (iii) above.
Proposition 7.2 Suppose that C(V ) is determined by the points V ′ = {v1, v2, vi3}, vi3 = v0,
and d(v1, v0) ≥ d(v2, v0). Then, the allocation defined by x1 = d(v1, v0), x2 = 2r∗ − d(v1, v0),
and xi = 0, for i 6= 1, 2, is in C(N, vII), where r∗ = R(V ).
Proof. Let vII(N) = 2R(V ) = 2r
∗ and
r′ = (d(v1, v0) + d(v2, v0))/2. (3)
We claim that r∗ ≤ r′. Indeed, consider a point x′ on the segment [v1, v0] satisfying
d(x′, v1) = r
′. Then, from the triangle inequality, d(x′, v2) ≤ d(x′, v0)+d(v0, v2) = d(v1, v0)−
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(d(v1, v0) + d(v2, v0))/2 + d(v2, v0) = r
′. Hence, a circle of radius r′, centered at the point
x′ on the segment connecting v1 and v0 and satisfying d(x
′, v1) = r
′, encloses the 3 points
{v0, v1, v2}. Therefore, r∗, the radius of the minimal circle is at most r′, and we have x1 =
d(v1, v0) = vII({v1}), and x2 = 2r∗−d(v1, v0) ≤ 2r′−d(v1, v0) = d(v2, v0) = vII({v2}). Thus,
setting xi = 0, for i 6= 1, 2, we obtain an allocation in the core C(N, vII). 
Next we turn to the allocation of vII(N) when the three points spanning the minimal
circle C(V ) are {v1, v2, v3}, and v0 is inside the circle.
We will need to use some properties of the optimal circle, and the fact that v0 is inside.
Assume without loss of generality that
d(v1, v0) ≥ d(v2, v0) ≥ d(v3, v0). (4)
Remark 7.2 We note that when v0 is inside the circle, and no pair of the triplet is diamet-
rical, then in every core allocation for the 3 player game, each player will have to pay some
positive amount. (For each pair, S = {vi, vj} ⊆ {v1, v2, v3}, we have xi + xj ≤ vII(S) < 2r∗,
implying xk = 2r
∗ − (xi + xj) > 0, for k 6= i, j.)
Next, since the radius of the circle centered at v0, and covering the set {v1, v2, v3} is at
least r∗, we must have d(v1, v0) = max(d(v1, v0), d(v2, v0), d(v3, v0)) ≥ r∗. In fact, a stronger
inequality holds.
Remark 7.3 Under the assumption on the relative position of the points given in (4), the
following inequalities hold:
4r∗ ≥ d(v1, v0) + d(v2, v0) ≥ 2r∗,
for each point v0 in the circle. The left inequality is obvious. To prove the right inequality
suppose by contradiction that 2r′ = d(v1, v0)+ d(v2, v0) < 2r
∗ for some point v0 in the circle.
(Recall that r′ was defined in (3).) Then, a circle of radius r′, centered at the point x′ on the
segment connecting v1 and v0 and satisfying d(x
′, v1) = r
′, encloses the 4 points {v0, v1, v2, v3}
(d(v1, x
′) = r′ and for i = 2, 3, d(vi, x
′) ≤ d(x′, v0) + d(v0, vi) ≤ d(x′, v0) + d(v0, v2) = r′.)
Hence, we have contradicted the minimality of r∗.
Remark 7.4 By maximizing the convex function d(y, v1)+d(y, v2)+d(y, v3), it can be shown
that for any point v0 inside the enclosing circle we have
2r∗ ≤ d(v1, v0) + d(v2, v0) ≤ d(v1, v0) + d(v2, v0) + d(v3, v0) ≤ (2 + 2
√
2)r∗.
Both, the 2r∗ uniform lower bound and the (2 + 2
√
2)r∗ uniform upper bound are asymp-
totically tight. (For the lower bound consider the case where d(v1, v0) = 2r
∗, and v2 and
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v3 are arbitrarily close to v0. For the upper bound consider the case where v1 and v0 are
the end points of some diameter, say d1, and v2 and v3 are the end points of the diameter
perpendicular to d1.)
Another useful observation is that for any triplet {v0, vi, vj}, vII({vi, vj}) is bounded
below by the longest edge of the triangle formed by the triplet,
vII({vi, vj}) ≥ max(d(vi, vj), d(vi, v0), d(vj , v0)).
Moreover, if the longest edge is not the diameter, then vII({vi, vj}) = 2r, where
r = abc/4
√
k(k − a)(k − b)(k − c),
k = (a+ b+ c)/2, a = d(vi, v0), b = d(vj , v0), c = d(vi, vj).
We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1 Given a triplet of points v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3, let r
∗ be the radius of the minimal disk
enclosing the triplet, and suppose that 2r∗ > d(v′i, v
′
j), for all i, j = 1, 2, 3. Given a positive
real number r′, such that d(v′3, (v
′
1 + v
′
2)/2) ≥ r′, let u′ be a point in the above disk satisfying
d(v′3, u
′) = r′. Then, v1,2(u′, r′), the diameter of the smallest circle enclosing v′1, v
′
2 and u
′,
satisfies v1,2(u′, r′) ≥ 2r∗ − r′.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that r∗ = 1 and d(v′1, v
′
3) ≥ d(v′2, v′3). There-
fore, the three points admit a representation as v′1 = (− cosα,− sinα), v′2 = (cosα,− sinα)
and v′3 = (cos β, sin β) with 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ π/2.
The supposition 2r∗ = 2 > d(v′i, v
′
j), for all i, j = 1, 2, 3, also implies that α < β.
With this configuration, (0, 0) is the center of the ball that spans v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3. (Note that
r∗ = 1 = ‖v′i‖, i = 1, 2, 3.)
Define B(v′3, r
′) to be the ball centered at v′3 with radius r
′. Let B∗ = B∗(v′1, v
′
2, r
′) be the
ball of smallest radius which contains v′1, v
′
2 and intersects the boundary of B(v
′
3, r
′). r(B∗)
denotes the radius of B∗. See Figure 5 for a graphical instance of this situation. It is clearly
sufficient to show that 2r(B∗) ≥ 2− r′.
We first prove that c′, the center of B∗, satisfies c′ = (0, c), (i.e., c′ is on the bisector
of v′1 and v
′
2) with c < 0. Since r
′ > 0 it follows that r(B∗) < r∗ = 1. Thus, if
c′ = (0, c), then clearly c < 0.
If the edge [v′1, v
′
2] intersects B(v
′
3, r
′), then c′ is the midpoint of [v′1, v
′
2] and c
′ = (0,− sinα).
Hence, suppose that B(v′3, r
′) does not intersect [v′1, v
′
2]. For i = 1, 2, let ui be the point on
the edge [v′3, v
′
i] such that d(ui, v
′
3) = r
′. The ball B∗ is determined by the triplet {v′1, v′2, u},
where u is some point on the arc of B(v′3, r
′), connecting u1 with u2.
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v′1
c′
v′2
v′3
u′
r(B∗)
r′
r∗
Figure 5: An instance of the situation expressed in Lemma 7.1.
From the minimality of B∗, if all the three points are on the boundary of B∗, then clearly
c′ is on the bisector of v′1 and v
′
2 with c < 0. The same result holds when [v
′
1, v
′
2] is a diameter
of B∗.
Hence, suppose that either [u, v′2] is a diameter of B
∗, and v′1 is strictly inside B
∗, or
[u, v′1] is a diameter of B
∗, and v′2 is strictly inside B
∗.
In the former case we must have u = u2, otherwise, by replacing u by u”, sufficiently close
to u, on the arc of B(v′3, r
′), connecting u and u2, we would obtain a ball containing v
′
1, v
′
2
and u”, whose radius is smaller than r(B∗). But, [v′2, u2] cannot be a diameter of B
∗, since
d(v′1, u2) > d(v
′
2, u2).
Finally, suppose that [u, v′1] is a diameter of B
∗, and v′2 is strictly inside B
∗. Again, by
the above argument we must have u = u1. We will show that the midpoint of [v
′
1, u1] cannot
be the center of B∗.
Let cu = (c1, c2) be the midpoint of [v′1, u1]. Define c¯ = (0, c
2). Note that c1 ≤
−cosα+cos β
2 < 0, since α < β. Then, it is easy to see that
r(B∗) = d(v′1, c
u) < d(v′1, c¯) = d(v
′
2, c¯) < d(v
′
2, c
u).
In particular, we obtain the contradiction that v′2 is outside B
∗.
This concludes the proof that c′ = (0, c) for some c < 0.
Claim.
d(v′3, c
′) + d(c′, v′2) > d(v
′
3, 0) + d(0, v
′
2) = 2. (5)
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Proving the claim will conclude the proof of the lemma since
2r∗ − r′ = 2− r′ = d(v′3, 0) + d(0, v′2)− r′ < d(v′3, c′) + d(c′, v′2)− r′ ≤ v1,2(u, r′).
(The last inequality follows from the triangle inequality d(v′3, c
′) ≤ d(v′3, u) + d(u, c′) =
r′ + d(u, c′), and the fact that d(c′, u) = d(c′, v′2) = v
1,2(u, r′)/2.)
Proof of claim. Consider the function f(z) = ‖z− v′2‖+ ‖z− v′3‖ when z moves on the line
{z ∈ R2 : z1 = 0}. Parametrizing the function on its unique variable, say λ, results in:
f(λ) =
√
cos2 α+ (λ+ sinα)2 +
√
cos2 β + (λ− sin β)2
=
√
1 + λ2 + 2λ sinα+
√
1 + λ2 − 2λ sin β, λ ≤ 0.
Proving (5) is equivalent to showing that f(c) > f(0). Then, observe that f is a real
value convex function and thus if the function is decreasing at 0 the claim is true.
To this end, we compute the derivative of f at 0.
f ′(λ) =
λ+ sinα√
1 + λ2 + 2λ sinα
+
λ− sin β√
1 + λ2 − 2λ sin β ,
and substituting at 0, we get
f ′(0) = sinα− sin β < 0,
since α < β. This concludes the proof of the claim.

One can give necessary conditions for the existence of a core allocation x = (x1, x2, x3).
For example, since x1 + x2 + x3 = 2r
∗, and x3 ≤ d(v3, v0) = vII({v3}), we must have
vII({v1, v2}) ≥ x1 + x2 = 2r∗ − x3 ≥ 2r∗ − d(v3, v0). The next lemma gives a sharper
condition.
Lemma 7.2 Given a triplet of points v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3, let r
∗ be the radius of the minimal circle
enclosing the triplet. Let v0 be a point inside this minimal circle. Suppose that 2r
∗ > d(v′i, v
′
j),
for all i, j = 1, 2, 3.
Then, d(v′3, (v
′
1 + v
′
2)/2) > d(v
′
1, v
′
2)/2, and vII({v′1, v′2)}, defined as the diameter of the
minimal circle containing {v0, v′1, v′2}, satisfies 2r∗ − d(v0, v′3) ≤ vII({v′1, v′2)}.
Proof.
Suppose without loss of generality that r∗ = 1 and d(v′1, v
′
3) ≥ d(v′2, v′3). We introduce a
reference system of coordinates with the origin (0, 0) at C, the center of the circle spanned
by v′1, v
′
2, v
′
3. Then, v
′
1 = (− cosα,− sinα), v′2 = (cosα,− sinα) and v′3 = (cos β, sin β) with
0 < α < β ≤ π/2.
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For any feasible v′3(β) = (cos β, sin β), π/2 ≥ β > α > 0, we have
d((v′1 + v
′
2)/2, v
′
3(β)) =
√
1 + sin2 α+ 2 sin β sinα ≥
√
1 + 3 sin2 α > 1 > d(v′1, v
′
2)/2.
v′1
(v′1 + v
′
2)/2
v′2
v′3
y
r∗
Figure 6: An instance of the situation expressed in Lemma 7.2.
Let r′′ = d(v′3, (v
′
1+v
′
2)/2))−d(v′1, v′2)/2. (r′′ is well defined since d(v′1, v′2)/2 ≤ d(v′3, (v′1+
v′2)/2)).) Let y be the point on the line segment [v
′
3, (v
′
1 + v
′
2)/2)], satisfying d(y, v
′
3) = r
′′.
Note that the minimal circle enclosing {y, v′1, v′2} is centered at the point (v′1 + v′2)/2, and
its diameter is d(v′1, v
′
2).
Applying Lemma 7.1 with r′ = r′′ and u = y, we obtain
2− d(v′3, y) = 2− r′′ ≤ v12(y, r′′) = d(v′1, v′2). (6)
We consider two cases:
i) d(v′3, v0) ≤ d(y, v′3).
In this case we apply Lemma 7.1 with r′ = d(v′3, v0) and u = v0. (Note that in this case
r′ ≤ d(v′3, y) ≤ d(v′3, (v′1 + v′2)/2).) Thus,
2− r′ = 2− d(v′3, v0) ≤ v12(v0, r′) = vII({v′1, v′2}).
ii) d(v′3, v0) > d(y, v
′
3).
In this case we have 2− d(v′3, v0) < 2− d(y, v′3). Applying (6) we obtain
2− d(v′3, v0) < 2− d(y, v′3) ≤ d(v′1, v′2) ≤ vII({v′1, v′2}).
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
We now continue the proof of the nonemptiness of the core when the minimal circle is
defined by the points {v1, v2, v3} and vi 6= v0 for all i = 1, 2, 3.
Condition Allocation
Case I d(vi, vj) ≥
√
2, ∀i, j, i 6= j, (d(v3, v0) ≤ d(v2, v0) ≤ d(v1, v0))
(a) d(v3, v0) ≥ 2−
√
2 (2
√
2− 2, 2−√2, 2−√2)
(b) d(v3, v0) ≤ 2−
√
2 (1− d(v3, v0)/2, 1− d(v3, v0)/2, d(v3, v0))
Case II d(v1, v2) <
√
2 ≤ d(v2, v3) ≤ d(v1, v3)
(c) d(v3, v0) ≤
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2 (1− γd(v3, v0), 1 − (1− γ)d(v3, v0), d(v3, v0))
(d) d(v3, v0) ≥
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2
(d.1) d(v3, v0) ≥ d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2)− d(v1, v2)/2
(d1.i) d(v1, v0) ≤ d(v2, v0) (m, d(v1, v2)−m, 2− d(v1, v2))
(d1.ii) d(v1, v0) ≥ d(v2, v0) (d(v1, v2)−m′,m′, 2− d(v1, v2))
(d.2)
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2 ≤ d(v3, v0) ≤ d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2)− d(v1, v2)/2
(d2.1) d(v1, v2) ≥ 2− d(v0, v3)
(d2.1.i) d(v1, v0) ≤ d(v2, v0) (m, d(v1, v2)−m, 2− d(v1, v2))
(d2.1.ii) d(v1, v0) ≥ d(v2, v0) (d(v1, v2)−m′,m′, 2− d(v1, v2))
(d2.2) d(v1, v2) ≤ 2− d(v0, v3) ≤ 4−
√
2−
√
2 +
√
2
(d2.2.i) d(v0, v2) ≥ 0.4 (1− d(v0, v3)/2, 1− d(v0, v3)/2, d(v0, v3))
(d2.2.ii) d(v0, v2) ≤ 0.4 (1− d(v0, v3)/2, 1− d(v0, v3)/2, d(v0, v3))
Table 2: Different allocations for the planar Euclidean radius game
Proposition 7.3 If the minimal circle enclosing V is determined by three points {v1, v2, v3},
and v0 is inside this circle, then C(N, vII) 6= ∅.
Let m = min(d(v1, v0), d(v1, v2)/2) and m
′ = min(d(v2, v0), d(v1, v2)/2). Table 2 shows
allocations in C(N, vII) depending on the different cases.
Proof.
We consider the subgame with the player set {v1, v2, v3}. In the proof we distinguish
between two cases depending on the angles that the three points form with the center of
the circle. We assume without loss of generality that the minimal enclosing circle is of unit
length, i.e., r∗ = 1.
Case I: d(vi, vj) ≥
√
2, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j.
In this case the angle that the center of the minimal circle forms with each one of the
pairs of the three points is at least π/2. See Figure 7 for a graphical description of this
situation. A lower bound on the length of each edge connecting such a pair is
√
2. In fact,
a lower bound on the longer of the above 3 edges is
√
3, since the largest of the respective 3
angles is at least 2π/3. In this case we also have d(v2, v0) + d(v3, v0) ≥ d(v3, v2) ≥
√
2. Since
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v1
v2
v3
&%
'$
α3
α2
α1
Figure 7: Three points as in Case I of Proposition 7.3, αj ≥ π/2, j = 1, 2, 3..
by assumption, d(v2, v0) ≥ d(v3, v0), we obtain d(v2, v0) ≥
√
2/2. To conclude, in this case
we have
d(v1, v0) ≥ 1, d(v2, v0) ≥
√
2
2
, d(vi, vj) ≥
√
2, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j.
We consider two subcases:
Subcase (a): d(v3, v0) ≥ (2−
√
2).
In this subcase, since vII(S) ≥
√
2, when |S| = 2, it is sufficient to show that there is a
solution to the system x1+x2+x3 = 2, xi+xj ≤
√
2, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j, 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x2 ≤√
2/2, and 0 ≤ x3 ≤ (2−
√
2). One solution is given by x1 = (2
√
2− 2), x2 = x3 = (2−
√
2).
Subcase (b): d(v3, v0) ≤ (2−
√
2).
We will show that in this subcase, i.e., when d(v3, v0) is “small”, there is a core allocation
where x3 = d(v3, v0). Specifically, we will prove that the allocation (1 − d(v3, v0)/2, 1 −
d(v3, v0)/2, d(v3, v0)) is in the core.
First, since for i = 1, 2,
√
2− d(v3, v0) ≤ d(vi, v3)− d(v3, v0) ≤ d(vi, v0), i = 1, 2,
it will suffice to show that xi = 1− d(v3, v0)/2 ≤
√
2− d(v3, v0).
Similarly, since
√
2 ≤ min(d(v1, v3), d(v2, v3)) ≤ min(vII({v1, v3}), vII({v2, v3)}),
it will suffice to show that x1 + x3 = x1 + x2 = 1 + d(v3, v0)/2 ≤
√
2.
Thus, to satisfy the above we need to show that d(v3, v0) ≤ 2(
√
2− 1). Indeed, using the
condition in this subcase, we obtain d(v3, v0) ≤ (2−
√
2) < 2(
√
2− 1).
It remains to show that x1 + x2 = 2− d(v3, v0) ≤ vII({v1, v2}). Indeed, the above follows
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from Lemma 7.2 by setting v′i = vi, for i = 1, 2, 3.
We have now concluded Case I.
Case II: d(v1, v2) <
√
2, d(v1, v3), d(v2, v3) ≥
√
2.
In the second case there is (exactly) one angle that the center of the minimal circle forms
with one of the pairs of the 3 points which is smaller than π/2. Therefore, the largest angle
is at least (2π − π/2)/2 = 3π/4, and the second largest is at least π/2. Without loss of
generality, suppose that d(v3, v1) ≥ d(v3, v2) > d(v1, v2). (We do not assume anymore that
d(v0, v1) ≥ d(v0, v2) > d(v0, v3).) Therefore,
d(v3, v1) ≥
√
2 +
√
2, d(v1, v2) <
√
2, d(v3, v2) ≥
√
4− (d(v1, v2))2 ≥
√
2, (7)
√
4− (d(v1, v2)2 ≥ 2− d(v1, v2)
2
, whenever d(v1, v2) ≤ 8/5 = 1.6 . (8)
We introduce a reference system of coordinates with the origin (0, 0) at C, the center
of the ball spanned by v1, v2, v3. Then, v1 = (− cosα,− sinα), v2 = (cosα,− sinα) and
v3 = (cos β, sin β) with π/4 < α < β ≤ π/2, as depicted in Figure 8.
v1 v2
v3
&%
'$
α1α2
α3
Figure 8: Three points as in Case II of Proposition 7.3, with α3 < π/2 and α1, α2 ≥ π/2.
Define d(v1, v2)/2 = a = cosα. We first prove several useful inequalities.
For any feasible v3(β) = (cos β, sin β), π/2 ≥ β > α ≥ π/4,
d(v1, v3(β)) ≥
√
2 + 2 sinα ≥
√
2 + 2
√
2 ≥ d(v2, v3(β))
≥
√
4− (d(v1, v2))2 ≥
√
2 > d(v1, v2), (9)
d((v1 + v2)/2, v3(β)) =
√
1 + sin2 α+ 2 sin β sinα ≥
√
1 + 3 sin2 α
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>
√
5/2 ≥ 2a, (10)
d((v2 + v3(β))/2, v1) =
1
2
√
2 + 8 cos2 α+ 6cos β cosα+ 2 sin β sinα
≥ 1
2
√
2 + 8 cos2 α+ 2 sin2 α > 1 > a. (11)
We also have
d((v1 + v3(β))/2, v2) =
1
2
√
2 + 8 cos2 α− 6 cos β cosα+ 2 sin β sinα.
Since,
−6 cos β cosα+ 2 sinα sinβ ≥ 2 sin2 α− 6 cos2 α,
we conclude that
d((v1 + v3(β))/2, v2) ≥ 1
2
√
2 + 2 cos2 α+ 2 sin2 α ≥ 1 > a. (12)
We consider two subcases.
Subcase (c): d(v3, v0) ≤ (
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2) .
In this subcase we claim that the allocation
(1− γd(v3, v0), 1− (1− γ)d(v3, v0), d(v3, v0)),
where γ = (
√
2− 1)/(√2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2) < 1, is in the core.
First, setting v′i = vi, for i = 1, 2, 3, and applying Lemma 7.2, we note that in this case
we have x1 + x2 = 2− d(v3, v0) ≤ vII(v1, v2).
Thus, it is sufficient to show that
x1 = 1− γd(v3, v0) ≤
√
2 +
√
2− d(v3, v0) ≤ d(v1, v3)− d(v3, v0) ≤ d(v1, v0),
x1 + x3 = 1 + (1− γ)d(v3, v0) ≤
√
2 +
√
2 ≤ d(v1, v3),
and
x2 = 1− (1− γ)d(v3, v0) ≤
√
2− d(v3, v0) ≤ d(v2, v3)− d(v3, v0) ≤ d(v2, v0),
x2 + x3 = 1 + γd(v3, v0) ≤
√
2 ≤ d(v2, v3).
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The first two conditions are satisfied whenever,
d(v3, v0) ≤ (
√
2 +
√
2− 1)/(1 − γ) = (
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2).
Similarly, the last two conditions are satisfied whenever,
d(v3, v0) ≤ (
√
2− 1)/γ = (
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2).
Indeed, this is the condition in Subcase (c).
Subcase (d): d(v3, v0) ≥ (
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2)
Subsubcase (d1): d(v3, v0) ≥ d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2) − a.
(d1.i): d(v1, v0) ≤ d(v2, v0).
We show that the allocation (m, 2a − m, 2 − 2a), where m = min(a, d(v1, v0)) is in the
core. (Recall that a = d(v1, v2)/2, as defined in page 30.) Indeed, the inequalities defining
the core are satisfied:
• x1 + x2 = 2a = d(v1, v2) ≤ vII({v1, v2}).
• x1 = m ≤ d(v1, v0).
• x2 = 2a −m. Hence, it suffices to prove that 2a ≤ m + d(v2, v0). If m = a, we have
a ≤ d(v0, v1) and under our assumption, a ≤ d(v0, v1) ≤ d(v0, v2).
When m = d(v0, v1) we need to prove that 2a = d(v1, v2) ≤ d(v0, v1) + d(v0, v2). The
latter clearly holds by the triangle inequality.
• x3 = 2 − 2a, and we have to prove that 2 − 2a ≤ d(v0, v3). Now, since d(v0, v3) ≥
d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2) − a, it is sufficient to verify that d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2) − a ≥ 2 − 2a, or
equivalently that d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2) + a ≥ 2.
Indeed, using the inequality (5), we obtain that:
d(v3,
v1 + v2
2
)+a = d(v3,
v1 + v2
2
)+d(
v1 + v2
2
, v1) ≥ d(v3, c)+d(v1, c), ∀c ∈ [v1 + v2
2
, C],
where C = (0, 0) is the center of the circle spanning v1, v2, v3.
Applying the inequality for c = C, we obtain d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2) + a ≥ 2.
• x1+x3 = 2−2a+m. It is sufficient to prove that 2−(2a−m) ≤ d(v1, v3) ≤ vII({v1, v3}).
We prove that x1+x3 = 2−2a+m ≤ d(v1, v3). Moreover, since d(v1, v3) ≥ d(v1, (0, 1)) =√
2 + 2 sinα, it will suffice to show that
2− 2a+m ≤ 2− a = 2− cosα ≤ √2 + 2 sinα.
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Equivalently, we will show that for π/4 ≤ α ≤ π/2, f(α) = cosα+√2 + 2 sinα ≥ 2.
Define the function g(x) =
√
1− x2+√2 + 2x, for √2/2 ≤ x ≤ 1. Since g(x) is concave
its minimum is given by min(g(
√
2/2), g(1)) = g(1) = 2.
• x2 + x3 = 2−m.
Suppose first thatm = a. In this case we prove that 2−cosα ≤ d(v2, v3) ≤ vII({v2, v3}).
Let u2 = (cosα, sinα). Since d(v2, v3) ≥ d(u2, v2) = 2 sinα, it will suffice to show that
2− a = 2− cosα ≤ 2 sinα.
Equivalently we will show that for π/4 ≤ α ≤ π/2, f(α) = cosα+ 2 sinα ≥ 2.
Define the function g(x) =
√
1− x2 + 2x, for √2/2 ≤ x ≤ 1. Since g(x) is concave its
minimum is given by min(g(
√
2/2), g(1)) = g(1) = 2.
Next, suppose that m = d(v1, v0). We apply Lemma 7.2 with v
′
1 = v2, v
′
2 = v3, v
′
3 = v1
to obtain
x2 + x3 = 2− d(v1, v0) ≤ vII({v2, v3}).
(d1.ii): d(v1, v0) ≥ d(v2, v0).
We show that the allocation (2a −m′,m′, 2 − 2a), where m′ = min(a, d(v2, v0)) is in the
core. Indeed, the core inequalities are satisfied:
• x1 + x2 = 2a = d(v1, v2) ≤ vII({v1, v2}).
• x2 = m′ ≤ d(v2, v0).
• x1 = 2a −m′. Hence, it suffices to prove that 2a ≤ m′ + d(v1, v0). If m′ = a, we have
a ≤ d(v0, v2) and under our assumption, a ≤ d(v0, v2) ≤ d(v0, v1).
When m′ = d(v0, v2) we need to prove that 2a = d(v1, v2) ≤ d(v0, v1) + d(v0, v2). The
latter clearly holds by the triangle inequality.
• x3 = 2− 2a, and we have to prove that 2− 2a ≤ d(v0, v3). The proof is the same as in
the previous case (d1.i).
• x2+x3 = 2−2a+m′, and it is sufficient to prove that 2−(2a−m′) ≤ 2−a ≤ d(v2, v3) ≤
vII({v2, v3}).
Indeed, the inequality 2− a ≤ d(v2, v3) is proven for the respective item in (d1.i).
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• x1 + x3 = 2−m′. Suppose first that m′ = d(v2, v0). In this case we apply Lemma 7.2
with v′1 = v1, v
′
2 = v3, v
′
3 = v2 to obtain
x1 + x3 = 2−m′ ≤ vII({v1, v3}).
Next suppose thatm′ = a. It is sufficient to prove that 2−a ≤ d(v1, (0, 1)) ≤ d(v1, v3) ≤
vII({v1, v3}).
Indeed, these inequalities are proven for the respective item in (d1.i).
Subsubcase (d2): d(v3, (v1 + v2)/2) − a ≥ d(v3, v0) ≥
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2− 2.
We will first prove the following inequality:
d(v1, v3)− d(v0, v3)/2 ≥ 1. (13)
The left hand side of inequality (13) satisfies:
d(v1, v3)− d(v0, v3)
2
≥
√
(cos β + cosα)2 + (sin β + sinα)2
−(
√
cos2 β + (sin β + sinα)2 − cosα)/2
=
√
2
√
1 + cos(β − α)
−1/2
√
1 + sin2 α+ 2 sin β sinα+ 1/2 cos α
≥
√
2
√
1 + sinα− 1/2
√
1 + sin2 α+ 2 sinα
+1/2 cosα. (14)
The last inequality follows from the fact that the respective expression is a monotone
decreasing function of β, for any fixed α. Define the function f(x) =
√
2
√
1 + x− (1+x)/2+√
1− x2/2. (Note that the right hand side of (14) is f(sinα).) The function f(x) is concave
and therefore its minimum is attained at one extreme point of the interval
√
2/2 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Evaluating, we obtain: f(
√
2/2) = 1/2
√
2
√
4 + 2
√
2−1/2 = 1.3477 and f(1) = 1. Therefore,
inequality (13) holds.
(d2.1): d(v1, v2) ≥ 2− d(v0, v3).
(Note that in Subcase (d), since d(v0, v3) ≥
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2 − 2, the above is satisfied if
d(v1, v2) ≥ 4−
√
2−
√
2 +
√
2).
(d2.1.i): d(v1, v0) ≤ d(v2, v0).
Set x1 = m,x2 = d(v1, v2) −m,x3 = 2− d(v1, v2), where m = min(d(v1, v0), d(v1, v2)/2).
We will show that this allocation is in the core.
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We have x1 ≤ d(v1, v0). Also, if x1 = d(v1, v2)/2, then x2 = d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ d(v1, v0) ≤
d(v2, v0). Otherwise, from the triangle inequality x2 = d(v1, v2)− d(v1, v0) ≤ d(v2, v0). Also,
from (d2.1) we obtain x3 ≤ d(v3, v0).
We have x1 + x2 = d(v1, v2) ≤ vII({v1, v2}).
Suppose first that x1 = d(v1, v2)/2. Then, x1 + x3 = x2 + x3 = 2 − d(v1, v2)/2. Since
d(v2, v3) ≤ d(v1, v3), and d(vj , v3) ≤ vII({vj , v3}), for j = 1, 2, it will suffice to show that
2− d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ d(v2, v3).
If x1 = d(v1, v0), then x2 + x3 = 2− d(v1, v0). Applying Lemma 7.2 with v′1 = v2, v′2 = v3
and v′3 = v1, we obtain x2 + x3 ≤ vII({v2, v3}). In this case we have x1 + x3 ≤ d(v1, v2)/2 +
2− d(v1, v2) = 2− d(v1, v2)/2. Again, it will suffice to show that 2− d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ d(v2, v3).
Indeed, the latter holds since applying inequalities (7), d(v2, v3) ≥
√
4− (d(v1, v2))2 and
applying inequality (8),
√
4− (d(v1, v2))2 ≥ 2 − d(v1, v2)/2, whenever d(v1, v2) ≤ 8/5 = 1.6.
(Recall that in Case II d(v1, v2) <
√
2.)
(d2.1.ii): d(v1, v0) ≥ d(v2, v0).
Set x2 = m
′, x1 = d(v1, v2)−m′, x3 = 2−d(v1, v2), where m′ = min(d(v2, v0), d(v1, v2)/2).
We will show that this allocation is in the core.
Then, x2 ≤ d(v1, v0). Also, if x2 = d(v1, v2)/2, then x1 = d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ d(v2, v0) ≤
d(v1, v0). Otherwise, from the triangle inequality x1 = d(v1, v2)− d(v2, v0) ≤ d(v1, v0). Also,
from (d2.1) we obtain x3 ≤ d(v3, v0).
We have x1 + x2 = d(v1, v2) ≤ vII({v1, v2}).
Suppose first that x2 = d(v1, v2)/2. Then, x1 + x3 = x2 + x3 = 2 − d(v1, v2)/2. Since
d(v2, v3) ≤ d(v1, v3), and d(vj , v3) ≤ vII({vj , v3}) for j = 1, 2, it will suffice to show that
2− d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ d(v2, v3).
If x2 = d(v2, v0), then x1+x3 = 2− d(v1, v0). Applying Lemma 7.2 with v′1 = v1, v′2 = v3,
and v′3 = v2, we obtain x2 + x3 ≤ vII({v2, v3}). In this case we have x2 + x3 ≤ d(v1, v2)/2 +
2− d(v1, v2) = 2− d(v1, v2)/2. Again, it will suffice to show that 2− d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ d(v2, v3).
Indeed, the latter holds since applying first inequality (7) and then (8), it holds d(v2, v3) ≥√
4− (d(v1, v2))2 ≥ 2− d(v1, v2)/2, whenever d(v1, v2) ≤ 8/5 = 1.6.
(d2.2): d(v1, v2) ≤ 2− d(v0, v3) ≤ 4−
√
2−
√
2 +
√
2.
(d2.2.i): d(v0, v2) ≥ 0.4.
We prove that the allocation (1− d(v0, v3)/2, 1− d(v0, v3)/2, d(v0, v3)) is in the core. The
inequalities defining the core are:
• x1 = 1−d(v0, v3)/2 ≤ d(v1, v0). Thus, we have to prove that 1 ≤ d(v1, v0)+d(v0, v3)/2.
From the triangle inequality and inequality (13) we have d(v1, v0) + d(v0, v3)/2 ≥
d(v1, v3)− d(v0, v3)/2 ≥ 1.
• x2 = 1 − d(v3, v0)/2 ≤ d(v2, v0). Indeed, x2 = 1 − d(v3, v0)/2 < 1 − 1.2/2 = 0.4 ≤
d(v2, v0).
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• The inequality x1 + x2 ≤ vII({v1, v2}) follows from Lemma 7.2, setting v′i = vi, for
i = 1, 2, 3.
• x1 + x3 = 1 + d(v0, v3)/2. From inequality (13) we obtain 1 + d(v0, v3)/2 ≤ d(v1, v3).
Thus, since d(v1, v3) ≤ vII({v1, v3}), we have x1 + x3 ≤ vII({v1, v3}).
• Finally, we have to prove the inequality x2 + x3 = 1 + d(v0, v3)/2 ≤ vII({v2, v3}).
Using (d2.2) we obtain
1 + d(v0, v3)/2 ≤ 1 + (2− d(v1, v2))/2 = 2− d(v1, v2)/2.
We showed above in the previous case that 2−d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ d(v2, v3). Hence, x2+x3 ≤
d(v2, v3) ≤ vII({v2, v3}).
(d2.2.ii): d(v2, v0) ≤ 0.4.
Recall that in (d2.2) we already have d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ (2 − d(v0, v3))/2 ≤ 2 − (
√
2 +√
2 +
√
2)/2.
Again, like in the previous case, we prove that the allocation (1−d(v0, v3)/2, 1−d(v0 , v3)/2,
d(v0, v3)) is in the core. Indeed, the inequalities that define the core are:
• x1 = 1− d(v0, v3)/2 ≤ d(v1, v0). Again, from the triangle inequality and equations (13)
and (14) we have d(v1, v0) + d(v0, v3)/2 ≥ d(v1, v3)− d(v0, v3)/2 ≥ 1.
• x2 = 1− d(v3, v0)/2 ≤ d(v2, v0).
Here we will use the fact that a = cosα = d(v1, v2)/2 ≤ 2− (
√
2 +
√
2 +
√
2)/2 < 0.6,
and use the function
f(x, y) =
√
(cos y − cosx)2 + (sin y + sinx)2
−1/2(
√
cos2 y + (sinx+ sin y)2 − cos x),
with arccos(0.6) ≤ x ≤ π/2, x ≤ y ≤ π/2,
Note that
f(x, y) =
√
2− 2 cos(x+ y)− 1/2
√
1 + sin2 x+ 2 sinx sin y + 1/2 cos x
≥ √2− 2 cos 2x− 1/2(1 + sinx) + cos x
2
.
Consider the function
g(z) =
√
4− 4z2 − 1/2(1 +
√
1− z2) + z/2 = (3
√
1− z2 + z − 1)/2,
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for 0 ≤ z ≤ 0.6. This function is the right-hand side of the above inequality at z = cos x.
Clearly g(z) is concave since its second derivative is g′′(z) = −3/2z2/(1 − z2)(3/2) −
3/21/
√
1− z2. Therefore, its minimum is attained at one of the extreme points, hence
g(z) ≥ min{g(0), g(0.6)} = 1.
Now, since d(v2, v3) − d(v0, v3)/2 = f(α, β), we have that d(v2, v3) − d(v0, v3)/2 ≥ 1,
which in turn, by the triangle inequality implies
x2 = 1− d(v3, v0)/2 ≤ d(v2, v3)− d(v0, v3) ≤ d(v2, v0).
• The inequality x1 + x2 = 2 − d(v0, v3) ≤ vII({v1, v2}) follows from Lemma 7.2 while
setting v′i = vi, for i = 1, 2, 3.
• x1 + x3 = 1 + d(v0, v3)/2. From inequality (13) we obtain 1 + d(v0, v3)/2 ≤ d(v1, v3).
Thus, since d(v1, v3) ≤ vII({v1, v3}), we have x1 + x3 ≤ vII({v1, v3}).
• Finally, we have to prove the inequality x2 + x3 = 1 + d(v0, v3)/2 ≤ vII({v2, v3}).
However, the proof is the same as for the previous case (d2.2.i).

Propositions 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, all together, conclude the proof of Theorem 5.5.
